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Is it Sexual Harassment or Not? The Single
Incident Exception
McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police'
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sexual harassment in
the workplace. 2 In a 2004 case of first impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked at an employer's affirmative defense against a hostile work
environment claim involving a single incident of sexual harassment commit-
ted by a supervisor. 3 The Eighth Circuit modified the test handed down by the
Supreme Court in this situation.4 After outlining the historical background
and rationale for imposing liability on employers for the actions of their su-
pervisors, this Note will explore the logic behind the Eighth Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court test and analyze the implications of this inter-
pretation on workplaces in the Eighth Circuit.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On August 29, 2002, Jamie McCurdy filed suit against the Arkansas
State Police and the State of Arkansas claiming that she was sexually dis-
criminated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5
McCurdy sought damages against the two public entities for the conduct of an
Arkansas State Police ("ASP") employee, Sergeant Darryl Hall.6
McCurdy began her employment as a radio dispatcher for the ASP in
Little Rock, Arkansas, on April 28, 2002. 7 The incident giving rise to the
lawsuit occurred on July 5, 2002.8 McCurdy was working with two others in
the ASP Communications Center ("Center") 9 when Hall arrived and began to
1. 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
3. McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762.
4. See id.
5. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 275 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (E.D. Ark. 2003);
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17.
6. McCurdy, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
7. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 764.
8. Id.
9. Id. McCurdy's co-workers included one female, Jeanne Hill and one male,
Tracy Wilson. Id.
1
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sexually harass her.'0 In her complaint, McCurdy alleged that Hall walked
into the Center, immediately reached under her arm, and grabbed her breast. I
According to McCurdy, she pulled away from Hall, but he proceeded to grab
her arm.' Hall told her "she had a hole in her shirt" and, when she looked
down, Hall commented, "stop looking at your tits."
'13
The sexual harassment allegedly continued as Hall sat down next to
McCurdy and asked her about her attire, which was not her normal uniform
since it was a casual dress day at the Center. 14 After she explained her lack of
uniform, Hall informed her that if he was the chief, her uniform would consist
of "panties and a tank top."' 5 McCurdy continued to do her job and did not
respond to Hall's comments. 
16
Hall left shortly, only to return and begin playing with McCurdy's
hair.' 7 McCurdy attempted to remove herself from the situation, but Hall or-
dered her to turn around, and he continued to run his fingers through her
hair.' 8 McCurdy finally extricated herself from the radio room but, upon her
return, Hall was still there.' 9 He informed her that she had "a real nice voice
on the radio" and that "she turned him on." 20 Finally, as Hall left the radio
room that evening, he hugged McCurdy without her consent, pressing his
body against hers in a manner that, in her view, "any reasonable person
would know a reasonable woman would object to. 21
McCurdy wasted little time before taking action; she called Sergeant
Shawn Garner that night to report Hall's behavior.22 McCurdy and Garner
met that evening around 9:00 p.m., and after their meeting, Garner called
23Hall's direct supervisor, Lieutenant Gloria Weakland. Weakland determined
that McCurdy would not work with Hall the rest of that weekend.24 On Mon-
day morning, Weakland continued to report the incident up the chain of
10. Id. at 764-65. Sergeant Hall had entered the room to await a trooper who was
transporting an inmate from a hospital to a holding cell. McCurdy, 275 F. Supp. 2d at
985.





16. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 2004).




21. Id. at 984-85.
22. Id. at 985. Garner was not McCurdy's direct supervisor but was the highest
ranking individual on duty that evening. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. McCurdy was not scheduled to work again until Tuesday. Id.
[Vol. 71
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command, speaking with Captain Carl Kirkland.23 Interviews of the witnesses
to the incident also occurred on Monday.26 Additionally, McCurdy was as-
signed to different radio dispatching shifts to avoid interaction with Hall for
that week, and Hall was specifically instructed not to have any contact with
McCurdy. 27 After Hall spoke with McCurdy through the Communication
Center radio about job-related manners on two separate occasions, he was
transferred to the Governor Security Detail unit to ensure no further contact,
inadvertent or otherwise.
28
Throughout this process, the ASP adhered to the written complaint pro-
cedures 29 and administered the process in a relatively expedient manner.30
After extensive investigations, including polygraph tests on Hall and
McCurdy, 31 the ASP Commission transferred Hall to a Patrol Division in Fort
32Smith, Arkansas, and demoted him to the rank of corporal. Although Hall
was originally found to have violated ASP Workplace Harassment and Sexual
Harassment policy, review committees subsequently determined (based on
the results of Hall's two polygraph tests) that McCurdy's allegations were





28. Id. at 987-88.
29. See id. at 985-87. ASP Field Operations Policy and Procedure Manual indi-
cates how a complaint of officer misconduct is investigated. Id. at 985. First, a Po-
lice/Citizen Complaint Forri is completed by the complainant, and then a Special
Investigations Unit has thirty days to complete an investigation. Id. at 986. The results
of the investigation are turned over to the Division Commander with any recom-
mended disciplinary actions. Id. If there is a recommended disciplinary action, the
Commander then must convene a Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB") for further
consideration of the matter. Id. Based on majority vote, the DRB recommends disci-
plinary action to the Assistant Directors for their review to the Director, who renders
the final decision. Id. An appeal is available for the accused officer if termination or
several other enumerated actions are rendered, and the ASP Commission will either
approve or revise the Director's decision after a full hearing. Id.
30. See id. at 993. The entire investigation, which began on July 9, 2002, was
completed in two and a half months, and the appeal process lasted another month and
a half, with the transfer and demotion occurring on November 15, 2002. See id.
31. Id. at 988.
32. Id. at 989.
33. Id. at 988. On July 10, 2002, Lieutenant Nathaniel Jackson was assigned to
investigate the allegations. Id. at 986. After Jackson administered and analyzed the
first polygraph test on Hall, he determined that Hall had violated policy mandating
that all employees should be free from all forms of harassment, which includes un-
welcome sexual advances and forms of physical contact. Id. Jackson reported his
findings to Kirkland. Id. at 987. Kirkland concluded that, not only had Hall violated
the harassment policies, but he had violated the ASP Rules of Conduct regarding the
20061
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Based on Hall's conduct on July 5, 2002, McCurdy sued the ASP, con-
tending that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. 34 The federal
district court in Arkansas held that "the ASP could not be vicariously liable
for Sergeant Hall's conduct" and the court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. 35 On appeal, McCurdy argued that the district court misapplied
the Supreme Court's test for the availability of an affirmative defense.36 The
ASP responded that the district court was correct in granting the summary
judgment and, even if the district court was wrong, Hall's conduct was not
severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable sexual harassment. 37 The
Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of the ASP, affirming the lower court's grant of
summary judgment.38 The Eighth Circuit held that the Supreme Court, in
creating the Title VII affirmative defense, did not intend to hold employers
"strictly liable for single incidents of supervisor sexual harassment." 39 There-
fore, the Eighth Circuit held that, in cases of single incidents of sexual har-
assment, employers are entitled to an affirmative defense as long as they can
prove they promptly exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any
40sexually harassing behavior.
use of "coarse language and gestures, insubordination, and improper conduct." Id.
Kirkland recommended Hall's sanctions (including probation for one year, counsel-
ing, and a demotion in rank) to Major J.R. Howard. Id. Howard appointed a DRB to
review the recommendation. Id. After a second round of polygraph tests and informal
depositions (in which Hall admitted to some improper conduct), the DRB determined
that McCurdy's allegations were "unfounded" but that Hall had violated the coarse
language, gestures, and insubordination-truthfulness provisions. Id. at 988. The DRB
recommended a transfer, demotion, and a psychological evaluation. Id. at 988-89. The
DRB's recommendations and findings were transferred to Lieutenant Colonel Steve
Dozier, who, on September 16, 2002, recommended termination to Colonel Don Mel-
ton for violations of the truthfulness provision. Id. at 989. Colonel Melton terminated
Hall on September 26, 2002. Id. Hall appealed the decision to the ASP Commission
and the five person panel unanimously reinstated Hall after a hearing on November
15, 2002. Id. at 989.
34. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2004).
35. Id. See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) for the introduction of the two-
pronged affirmative defense to Title VII claims.
36. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 767.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 774.









Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the foundation for
sexual harassment claims against companies for incidents that occur in the
workplace:
4 1
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin ....42
The Act was originally intended to fight against racial discrimination in
the workplace and did not include sex discrimination as one of the original
discriminatory categories.43 Thanks to members of Congress who attempted
to kill the bill, sex discrimination was added in an "eleventh-hour amend-
ment." 44 The scope of that protection has been the subject of important case
law ever since.
45
B. Supreme Court Precedent
In 1986, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson46 laid the groundwork for
two landmark decisions the Supreme Court issued on the same day in 1998 .
In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that a hostile work environment is a vi-
able cause of action under Title VII.48 In order to establish a hostile work
environment claim created by a supervisor, four requirements must be met:
"(1) that [the employee] is a member of a protected group; (2) that [the em-
ployee] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); see also Melissa R. Null, Note, Disrespectful,
Offensive, Boorish & Decidedly Immature Behavior is not Sufficient to Meet the Re-
quirements of Title VII, 69 Mo. L. REv. 255,259-60 (2004).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
43. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id.
45. See Null, supra note 41.
46. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
47. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998).
48. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (2005).
2006)
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was based on sex; and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.
'4 9
More importantly, for the first time the Court stated that employers were
not "always automatically liable" for sexual harassment by supervisors they
employ. 50 The interpretation and scope of the Court's rejection of strict liabil-
ity for employers dealing with hostile work environment claims as a result of
their supervisors' actions is highly relevant to Ellerth and Faragher, the 1998
decisions, and now to McCurdy.
In Meritor, the plaintiff, Vinson, brought a Title VII action against her
bank supervisor and the bank.5' Vinson claimed that she had "constantly been
subjected to sexual harassment" by the bank supervisor and sought injunctive
relief and monetary damages.52 The testimony at trial indicated that Vinson
and her supervisor had sexual intercourse 40 or 50 times over the course of
several years and that Vinson was forced into this relationship out of a fear of
losing her job.5 3 Vinson claimed that the supervisor forcibly raped and pub-
licly fondled her on a number of occasions, and that a number of other female
employees were subject to similar inappropriate behavior.54 Vinson admitted
that she never reported this behavior and never utilized the bank's reporting
procedure because she was afraid of the supervisor.55 The district court found
for the defendants, stating that Vinson was "not the victim of sexual harass-
ment and.., not the victim of sexual discrimination" at the bank.56
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed this decision, find-
ing that there were two types of sexual harassment bases for a Title VII
claim.5 7 The appellate court relied heavily on the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's ("EEOC") "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex."58 The guidelines distinguish sexual harassment that involves condition-
ing an individual's employment on "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests
49. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 767-68 (8th Cir. 2004).
50. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Although Meritor was a unanimous decision, there
was a four-justice concurrence, authored by Justice Marshall, arguing against the not
"always automatically liable" statement made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his majority
opinion. Id. at 74-78. Meritor's importance cannot be overstated, as the
EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense stems from the statements of law made in Meritor.
In fact, the Court in Faragher stated that Meritor is the "foundation on which we build
today" and that the force of stare decisis was "enhanced" because Congress had
amended Title VII employer liability provisions since Meritor and had not modified its
holding, thereby providing implicit legislative approval. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792.




55. Id. at 61.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1985)).
[Vol. 71
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for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,"
from harassment that creates a hostile working environment. 59 Because the
trial court did not consider the existence and applicability of this latter form
of sexual harassment, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. 60 The ap-
pellate court also held that "an employer is absolutely liable for sexual har-
assment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer
knew or should have known about the misconduct."
6
'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the reasoning used by
the court of appeals, ultimately affirming the appellate court's decision but
using different rationale.62 The Court began by agreeing with the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals that a hostile work environment can be enough to
establish a Title VII claim.63 The Court, however, pointed out the high
threshold for a hostile work environment claim, stating that the harassment
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." '64 The
Court found that this threshold was clearly met in Meritor, not only because
of the allegations of forcible rape but also because of the duration of the
harassment. 65
The Meritor Court also tackled the issue of employer liability. The
EEOC, in its amicus curiae brief, argued that courts should use traditional
agency principles as a guide for determining employer liability.66 According
to the EEOC, in hostile work environment claims, "agency principles lead to
'a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment had reasonably
available an avenue of complaint regarding such harassment, and, if avail-
able and utilized, whether that procedure was reasonably responsive to the
employee's complaint."' 67 The EEOC added that if the victim does not util-
ize the procedure available to him or her, then the employer should be im-
mune from liability. 68 In other instances when the procedure is used by the
victim, "the employer will be liable if it has actual knowledge of the har-
assment or if, considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question
59. Id.
60. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
61. Id. at 63.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 63-64, 66.
64. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982).
65. Id.; see also Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Envi-
ronment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 437,445-46 (2002).
66. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70.
67. Id. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26,
Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979)).
68. Id. (citing Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26, Meritor,
477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979)).
2006)
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had no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint known
to appropriate management officials."
69
The EEOC's argument formed the basis of the central disagreement be-
tween the majority and the concurrence in Meritor. Justice Marshall, arguing
for the four-justice concurrence, stated that it is consistent with agency law to
set a standard that "an employer is liable if a supervisor or an agent violates
the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any other mitigating factor. 7 Jus-
tice Marshall argued that this strict liability standard was used when a tangi-
ble employment action arose out of the sexual harassment 7' ("quid pro quo")
and that "[t]here is therefore no justification for a special rule, to be applied
only in 'hostile environment' cases, that sexual harassment does not create
employer liability until the employee suffering the discrimination notifies
,,72
other supervisors.
Although the Court agreed with the EEOC that Congressional intent fa-
vored agency principles as a guide to courts' decision-making regarding em-
ployer liability standards for hostile work environment cases, the Court ulti-
mately left the issue to be determined another day.73 The Court stated that
employers should not be "always automatically liable" for the acts of their
supervisors, but the "absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily
insulate that employer from liability." 74 Similarly, the Court also noted that
simply having a procedure for filing a grievance against discrimination that
an alleged victim fails to utilize does not insulate the employer from liabil-
ity.75 Although the Court did not agree with the EEOC's position enough to
make a definitive rule on employer liability in Meritor, the language of the
EEOC's brief ultimately became the backbone of the Court's formation of a
two-pronged affirmative defense.
76
Having delayed the issue of employer liability for hostile work envi-
ronment claims for over a decade, "another day" arrived in 1998. In Ellerth
and Faragher, by a 7-2 decision in each case, the Court ruled that employers
were vicariously liable for the actions of their supervisors if the victims suf-
69. Id. (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26, Meri-
tor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979)).
70. Id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10,
1980)).
71. Id. at 76. "Following that approach, every Court of Appeals that has consid-
ered the issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory personnel is automati-
cally imputed to the employer when the harassment results in tangible job detriment
to the subordinate employee." Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 77 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. at 72 (majority opinion).
74. Id. (citation omitted). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§
219-237 (1958).
75. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
76. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
[Vol. 71
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fered a tangible employment action.77 If no tangible employment action befell
the employee, then an affirmative defense was available to the employer
against the hostile work environment allegation. 78 The Court finally explained
the meaning behind Meritor's not "always automatically liable" language by
laying out this two-pronged affirmative defense for employers in certain hos-
tile work environment claims.
Both Ellerth and Faragher were cases involving prolonged sexual har-
assment by men in supervisory positions over their accusers. 79 In neither of
these cases did the plaintiff report or complain to higher management about
their supervisors before filing suit.80 Additionally, in both cases the district
court viewed the alleged harassment as meeting the "severe or pervasive"
threshold for Title VII hostile work environment claims.8 1
In Ellerth, the harassment came from a vice president of one of the five
business units at Burlington Industries.8 2 Ellerth alleged that this vice presi-
dent made comments on three separate occasions that could be construed as
threats to deny her tangible job benefits.8 3 After the district court granted
summary judgment for Burlington, the court of appeals, en banc, reversed in
a severely fractured decision.
8 4
In Faragher, the plaintiff, a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, Flor-
ida, alleged that her two male supervisors sexually harassed her during the
five years that she worked for them.85 The district court held the City liable
for the harassment of its supervisory employees but the Eleventh Circuit,
relying on Meritor, reversed the district court's decision.8 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review and address the appellate courts' diverging
perspectives on Title VII.
8 7
77. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765-66; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court notes, "[a]
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 761.
78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780-82.
80. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748-49; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782-83.
81. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783. See generally Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
82. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
83. Id. at 747-48. In one such incident, the vice president told Ellerth, "you
know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington" and told her
to "loosen up." Id. at 748 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 749. Eight separate opinions arose out of the decision, with judges
disagreeing about the type of Title VII sexual harassment claim and the standard of
liability to apply to each claim. Id. at 749-51.
85. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780-82.
86. Id. at 775.
87. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786.
20061
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The Court in Ellerth first discussed the importance of terms such as
"quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment." 88 The Court pointed out that
those phrases were not used or mentioned anywhere in the text of Title VII.89
Although Meritor had stressed that agency principles controlled the employ-
ers' liability, courts' use of the two terms increased subsequent to that case.
90
"Quid pro quo" came to mean that the employer was subject to vicarious li-
ability and, therefore, this became the model cause of action for most plain-
tiffs in Title VII actions.9' However, the Court stressed that the underlying
question was really whether the employer was vicariously liable for its super-
visor and not whether the plaintiff could state a "quid pro quo" claim. 92
"When we assume discrimination can be proved ... the factors we discuss..
. and not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment, will be
controlling on the issue of vicarious liability."
93
Referring back to Meritor, the Court noted that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency is the proper starting point for analysis of the agency princi-
ples that determine employer liability.94 Restatement section 219(2)(d), which
deals with vicarious liability for intentional torts, states that a "master" is
subject to liability for the torts of "his servants" acting outside the scope of
their employment when "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of
the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."95 The
Court confirmed that whenever a supervisor took a tangible employment ac-
tion against the subordinate, he or she "was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation." 96 The Court thought it was clear that the
injury, for example the denial of a raise or a promotion, could not have oc-
curred without the agency relation. 97 Thus, the Court concluded that employ-
ment actions taken by the supervisor "become[ ] for Title VII purposes the act
of the employer." 98 Having determined this, the Court noted that in situations
88. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-52.
89. Id. at 752; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
90. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53. The two terms first appeared in academic litera-
ture. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32
(1979).
91. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753; see Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th
Cir. 1997); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
92. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
93. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
94. Id. at 755; see Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) (emphasis added).
96. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 744.
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where tangible employment actions do not arise, agency principles governing
employer liability are less clear.
99
The Ellerth Court referred back to Meritor and suggested that there are
factors beyond agency principles that are relevant to the discussion of em-
ployer liability. 00 These factors include Congress's intention to promote con-
ciliation rather than litigation within Title VII and the complimentary goals of
encouraging the creation of anti-harassment policies by employers and the
utilization of those reporting mechanisms by the employees.' 0' Balancing
these competing factors, the Court in both Ellerth and Faragher held that an
employer would be "subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee
for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible em-
ployment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative de-
fense to liability or damages."' 102 The Court determined that an employer has
an affirmative defense if it is shown: "(a) that the employer exercised reason-
able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise."'
0 3
The Court in Ellerth remanded the case so that Burlington could attempt
to assert and prove the affirmative defense.1°4 In Faragher, the City of Boca
Raton's lack of a disseminated sexual harassment policy precluded it from
successfully arguing the first element, and therefore, the Court reversed the
court of appeals' decision and reinstated the district court's judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. 105
The EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense served to clarify and expound
Meritor's two conflicting principles, that a hostile work environment was a
viable Title VII claim and that employers should not be always "automati-
cally liable" for the acts of their supervisors. t' The Court finally settled this
tension by creating a two-pronged affirmative defense against hostile work
environment claims. 10
7
99. Id. at 763.
100. Id. at 764.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 764-65 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)).
103. Id. at 765. The majority added that "[n]o affirmative defense is available,
however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Id.
104. See id. at 766.
105. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998).
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C. Eighth Circuit Precedent
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to an Eighth Circuit case, Todd v.
Ortho Biotech, Inc.,108 less than a year after Ellerth and Faragher. Todd in-
volved the sexual assault of an employee by her supervisor during a business
trip.' °9 At trial, a jury found the employer liable, but on appeal the Eighth
Circuit found that the employer took "prompt and effective remedial action"
and, therefore, the court reversed.'" ° After the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded in light of Ellerth and Faragher,I ' the Eighth Circuit remanded the
case back to the district court to address whether the EllerthiFaragher stan-
dard applied."
12
The main issue in Todd was whether a single severe act of sexual har-
assment could rise to the level of a hostile work environment claim.113 The
Eighth Circuit in this case hinted at things to come when it stated, "[n]either
the Supreme Court nor this court has squarely addressed this issue, and por-
tions of the opinions in Ellerth and Faragher cast doubt on its resolution." I4
The majority of this three judge panel deferred all issues to the district court
noting that the district court was better suited to address it. 15 Judge Arnold,
however, provided some insight into the matter in his concurrence. He stated
that, while he supported the decision to remand to allow the employer to ar-
gue the newly minted affirmative defense, he had "no doubt that a single se-
vere act of sexual harassment [could] amount to a hostile work environment
actionable under Title VII" and saw "nothing in Ellerth or Faragher to nega-
tive this proposition."116
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police," 7 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered whether it was appropriate for the district court to have
granted summary judgment in favor of the ASP under the United States Su-
108. 525 U.S. 802 (1998).
109. Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1999).
110. Id.
11. Id.




116. Id. at 599 (Arnold, J., concurring).
117. 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied (2004), cert. denied 125
S. Ct. 1088 (2005).
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preme Court affirmative defense test from Ellerth and Faragher. I Is The court
began its analysis by categorizing the five or six acts of alleged sexual har-
assment by Hall on July 5, 2002,11 9 as a single incident.120 Further, the court
assumed, for the purposes of the appeal, that the single incident met the "high
threshold" requirements for a Title VII hostile work environment claim. '
2
'
Before analyzing the affirmative defense available to the ASP, the
McCurdy court started with the premise that "Title VII does not hold employ-
ers strictly liable for all sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors.
'' 22
Citing Meritor,123 the Eighth Circuit stressed the emphasis the Supreme Court
put on considering agency principles when determining employer liability
under Title VII.124 Additionally, the court noted that since Meritor, courts of
appeals have struggled to create employer liability standards for hostile work
environment claims. 25 Finally, the court distinguished the situation from that
in Ellerth or Faragher by saying that the Supreme Court had never addressed
a situation like the one faced in McCurdy, where an employer's liability for a
single incident of sexual harassment committed by a supervisor was at issue.'
26
In its analysis of the Supreme Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher,
the Eighth Circuit stated that, for cases of supervisor harassment with no tan-
gible employment action, 127 agency principles are just one piece to the puz-
zle. 12 The court noted that encouraging employers to create anti-harassment
118. Id. at 767, 771.
119. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 275 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
120. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 768.
121. See id. at 767-68. "Federal sexual harassment standards are demanding, and
McCurdy must clear a high threshold to make an actionable claim requiring federal
intervention in her workplace in the State of Arkansas." Id. The court commented that
some courts may not find a single incident meets this threshold because it lacks sever-
ity or pervasiveness. Id. at 768 n.6; see Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326
F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a single incident of physical contact where
a co-worker grabbed the plaintiffs buttocks and later made jokes about it was not
actionable); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). Because
the majority did not believe ASP was liable for Hall's conduct on the night in ques-
tion, it declined "to address whether Sergeant Hall's conduct .. constitutes action-
able sexual harassment." McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 768 n.6.
122. Id. at 768.
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
124. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 768.
125. Id. at 768-69 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785
(1985)).
126. 1d. at 769 n.7.
127. Examples of tangible employment actions include "hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision caus-
ing a significant change in benefits" and they are defined as any action that causes "a
significant change in employment status." Id. at 769 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc.
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policies and reporting procedures and encouraging employees to use those
procedures are aims of Title VII in its goal of deterring and eradicating har-
assment in the workplace.129 The court concluded by remarking that cases in
which tangible employment actions are taken against the victim were easy to
deal with from an agency perspective because "there is assurance the injury
could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation."' 13 The court stated
that it was in the cases in which no tangible employment action arose that
principles outside of agency law, such as the twin aims of Title VII, came into
play.' 1 The court summarized the Supreme Court analysis by categorizing
hostile work environment claims into two distinct groups, harassment that
"culminates in a tangible employment action for which employers are strictly
liable" and harassment that occurs without tangible employment action where
"employers may assert an affirmative defense.' 32
The Eighth Circuit, expressing its disagreement with the affirmative de-
fense created in Ellerth and Faragher, turned to Justice Thomas' dissents for
guidance.' 33 The appellate court in McCurdy reiterated Justice Thomas' ar-
gument in Ellerth that the two-pronged test was not clearly defined and pro-
vided little guidance to employers, thereby "'ensuring a continuing reign of
confusion in this important area of the law."' 134 The Eighth Circuit remarked
that McCurdy "fulfills [Justice Thomas'] prophecy."'
135
Applying the affirmative defense to this case, the court denied
McCurdy's argument under the first prong that the ASP failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the sexually harassing behav-
ior. 136 The court took a longer look at the second prong, concluding that, in
cases of a single incident of harassment without a tangible employment ac-
tion, requiring the second prong would result in de-facto strict liability for the
employer if the employee promptly took advantage of the employer's report-
ing procedures. 37 Therefore, the court modified the Supreme Court's af-
firmative defense, proclaiming that the Court's test did not apply to the situa-
129. Id. at 769-70 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764).
130. Id. at 769 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62).
131. See id. at 770.
132. Id. at 770 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 771). Thomas predicted "more and more
litigation to clarify applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitioners and the
courts have been begging for guidance." Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 774).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 770-71. The court looked to the fact that she suffered no harassment
after she complained of it. Id. The ASP took all necessary steps to promptly investi-
gate the matter and protect the victim. Id. at 771.
137. See id. at 772. The court proclaimed that "[s]trict adherence to the Supreme
Court's two-prong affirmative defense in this case is like trying to fit a square peg
into a round hole. We will not tire ourselves with such an exercise." Id. at 771.
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tion in McCurdy and that, as long as the ASP met the first prong's require-
ment, it had an affirmative defense. The McCurdy court admitted that shift-
ing the responsibility onto the "innocent employee" was not fair, but it felt
that the Supreme Court had rejected the kind of vicarious liability that the test
would impose on employers for single incidents of sexual harassment.' 39 The
court decided that expanding strict liability was better left to the highest
court, not to the Eighth Circuit.140 Thus, the majority of this three-judge panel
held that the ASP was not liable for the actions of Hall because it swiftly and
effectively responded to McCurdy's report of the single incident of sexual
harassment. 141
B. The Dissent
In dissent, Judge Melloy argued that, because the ASP could not estab-
lish the second prong of the EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense, the ASP
remained liable assuming that Hall's actions rose to the level of a hostile
work environment claim. 42 His disagreement with the majority was based on
its modification of what he believed was a "remarkably clear" rule set forth
by the Supreme Court.' 43 Judge Melloy referenced the exact language of the
two-prong test, noting the use of the word "and" between the two prongs: "I
cannot read anything in EllerthiFaragher that creates an exception to the two
prong affirmative defense for those cases of single incident harassment that
do rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment."' 44 He dismissed the
majority's fears that denying the use of the affirmative defense for single
incidents of sexual harassment would create a strict liability standard for em-
ployers.145 He emphasized that most single incidents of alleged sexual har-
assment would not meet the high threshold standards for an actionable Title
VII claim.
146
The dissent pointed out another circuit's interpretations of this issue as
well as prior Eighth Circuit case law which supported his contention. 47 Judge
Melloy also noted that the EEOC supported the notion that the
EllerthiFaragher defense required both prongs to be met even if the situation
138. Id. at 772.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 774.
142. Id. at 775 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (quoting Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir.




147. Id.; see Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir.
1999); Moisant v. Air Midwest, Inc., 291 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2002); Todd v.
Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999).
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seemed "harsh to a law-abiding employer."'' 48 In conclusion, Melloy stated
that, while satisfying the first prong of the test might mitigate damages, it
alone will not create a complete defense to employer liability.1
49
V. COMMENT
Title VII was designed to eradicate discrimination from the workplace.
The Supreme Court correctly posited, however, that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was not a "general civility code" and was not intended to prohibit
"genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely
interact" with one another.150 The Eighth Circuit in McCurdy v. Arkansas
State Police failed to keep the purpose of Title VII in mind when it mistak-
enly read between the lines and distinguished the facts to modify the Supreme
Court's two-pronged affirmative defense against vicarious liability for em-
ployers.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's primary concern in McCurdy was to avoid expanding strict liability for
employers in situations where there has been only a single incident of sexual
harassment.' 5' This concern is exaggerated however, as most single incident
cases will not rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment.5' Title VII
was designed to address conduct so extreme as to "amount to a change in the
148. Id. at 776.
149. Id.
150. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
151. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772.
152. For a list of cases where the incidents were not severe or pervasive enough to
meet the high threshold claim of hostile work environment see Null, supra note 41, at
273 n. 114. The footnote references Duncan v. General Motors Co., 300 F.3d 928,
934-35 (8th Cir. 2002), which cites all of these cases. Examples include: Adusumilli
v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that when
employee made jokes aimed at the plaintiff, told her not to wave at police officers
"because people would think she was a prostitute," commented about low-necked
tops, leered at her breasts, and touched her arm, fingers, or buttocks on four occasions
the behavior in the aggregate was not sufficient to support the hostile work environ-
ment claim); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 823-24, 826 (6th Cir. 1997)
(when employee reached across plaintiff, stating "[n]othing I like more in the morning
than sticky buns" while staring at her suggestively; suggested to her that the land be
named "Hootersville," "Titsville," or "Twin Peaks"; and asked "weren't you there
Saturday night dancing on the tables?" while discussing property near a biker bar, the
court held the behavior to be offensive but not sufficient to support a hostile environ-
ment claim); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding no hostile work environment when plaintiff's supervisor asked her for dates,
asked her about her personal life, called her a "dumb blonde," put his hand on her
shoulder several times, placed "I love you" notes on her work station, and attempted
to kiss her three times).
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terms and conditions of employment."' 153 In fact, Meritor limited actionable
hostile work environment claims to only those that met a very high threshold,
"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule and insult,' .. . that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,' . . . Title VII is violated."' 5 4 The Supreme Court in Clark County
School District v. Breeden, facing a case involving a single incident of sexual
harassment, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision because the employee failed
to state an actionable hostile work environment claim.'55 The Court stressed
that a "recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand com-
ments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment""' 15 6 The
central issue for the Eighth Circuit in McCurdy should not have been how to
distinguish and modify the Supreme Court's two-pronged approach but rather
whether McCurdy's claim was actually an actionable hostile work environ-
ment claim.
A similar conclusion is echoed by a concurring judge in a Fifth Circuit
case that the McCurdy court principally relied on to support its unique modi-
fication of the EllerthiFaragher test.15 7 In Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc., the panel of circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of a
hostile work environment claim against a supervisor.15 8 All three judges con-
curred separately and, thus, as Judge Wiener pointed out in his "special con-
currence," none of the writings expressed precedent in the Fifth Circuit.
5 9
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit relied on Judge Jones' Indest opinion as a
basis for holding that employers need only satisfy the first prong of the
EllerthIFaragher defense to be free from liability in single incidents of sexual
harassment. 16
The Eighth Circuit should have instead followed the logic of Judge Wie-
ner's concurring opinion, in which he specifically rejected the notion that
only one of two prongs is needed to avoid strict liability.' 6 1 Judge Wiener
153. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
154. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
155. Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
156. Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (1998)) (alteration in original).
157. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 267.
159. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999)
(hereinafter Indest If).
160. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J.,
dissenting).
161. Indest I, 168 F.3d at 796-97 (Weiner, J., concurring). "Judge Jones's exon-
eration of Freeman's vicarious liability on but one element of the Court's new and
exclusive two-element, conjunctive defense cannot survive scrutiny under
Ellerth/Faragher." Id. at 797.
2006]
17
Ayres: Ayres: Oh. What a Tangled Web
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
pointed out that the Supreme Court's twin decisions in Ellerth and Faragher
were "remarkably straightforward and perfectly consistent" and that together
formed a "comprehensive framework for determining when an employer can
be held vicariously liable."' 162 The Supreme Court did not make exceptions or
limit its holding in Ellerth and Faragher; in fact, Judge Wiener explained, the
Court did not even apply the specific facts of the cases to its holding.' 63 Thus,
Judge Wiener' concluded that the Court's rule was meant to be broadly ap-
plied, and the Court clearly meant to include both prongs of the test for any
actionable hostile work environment claim.' 64
Judge Wiener concurred in the opinion because he believed that the su-
pervisor's conduct was neither severe nor pervasive, and therefore, the victim
could not recover from the employer in agency. 165 Similar to the McCurdy
majority, Judge Jones assumed that the harassment had met the threshold for
an actionable claim.' 66 Judge Jones, again like the Eighth Circuit, distin-
guished her opinion from the holding of Ellerth and Faragher by arguing that
the Supreme Court test applied only to longstanding misconduct by supervi-
sors, not single incidents.' 67 Judge Wiener, however, believed that distin-
guishing the straightforward language of the Supreme Court as Judge Jones
did, was "as neat an illusion as any sleight-of-hand artist ever created.' ' 168 He
disagreed completely with the concept that the Court somehow meant to limit
the breadth of its holding, stating:
[N]owhere does the Court imply, much less express, that short-
lived harassment such as the conduct alleged by Indest - in which,
soon after the onset of the harassment, the plaintiff reports the in-
appropriate behavior and the employer rapidly and appropriately
responds to that report - somehow falls outside the ambit of the
Court's mandate. 1
69
162. Id. at 796.
163. Id. at 800. "Markedly absent from this entire discussion is any reference -
much less any restriction - to the particular facts of Ellerth's case. The Court's focus
is squarely on the big picture." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 796. The facts involve a supervisor who allegedly made five sexual
comments or gestures over the course of a weeklong business convention. Id. at 797.
No tangible employment action arose from the harassment. Id. The behavior was
reported to the company almost immediately, even before the convention euided. Id.
166. Id. at 797.
167. Id. at 797-98.
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The Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense was meant to cover all potential
acts of a supervisor that fall under an employer's vicarious liability under
Title VII.' 7°
The Eighth Circuit jumped ahead of itself in McCurdy by bypassing the
initial threshold questions that need to be addressed in any Title VII case.
Judge Wiener correctly focused his attention as to whether the supervisor's
misconduct was actionable. 17' The first question is whether a tangible em-
ployment action was taken against the victim. The facts in both McCurdy and
Indest indicate that no tangible employment action was taken against the em-
ployee. The next inquiry is whether the action of the supervisor meets the
Meritor requirements of an actionable hostile work environment claim.172
Judge Wiener stressed a "totality of the circumstances" approach to this
threshold question.173 In his analysis of Indest, he found that neither the con-
duct nor the work environment that was created was actionable under the
law.
174
This second layer of analysis eliminates the unfounded fears of ex-
panded strict liability that were used to justify the Eighth Circuit and Judge
Jones's modification of Supreme Court precedent. If a claim is severe enough
to cause a hostile work environment, whether it is longstanding or a single
incident, then the Supreme Court has clearly said that an employer is liable
unless they can meet both prongs of the affirmative defense. 175 However, in
most cases of a single incident that is promptly corrected and remedied by the
employer as in both Indest and McCurdy, the quick response prevents the
misconduct from rising to the level of an actionable claim. 176 This is what the
Supreme Court had in mind when it allowed an employer to be vicariously
liable regardless of the duration. As Judge Wiener pointed out, when an em-
170. See id. at 801. Judge Wiener commented, "[t]his cherry-picking of but one of
two conjoint elements of the defense files directly in the face of identical statements
to the contrary in each of the two Supreme Court opinions." Id.
171. Id. at 802.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 802-03. The factors that make up the totality of circumstances include:
frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening or merely
offensive utterance, and to what degree it interfered with the employee's ability to
work. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 806.
175. See id. at 802. Judge Wiener explained:
It is, of course, theoretically possible for a supervisor to engage in suffi-
ciently severe conduct (e.g., raping, "flashing," or forcibly groping or dis-
robing the subordinate employee) in such a short period of time that, even
though (1) the employee reports the conduct immediately, (2) the em-
ployer takes swift and decisive remedial action, and (3) no tangible em-
ployment action ensues, the employer could still be held vicariously liable
under the Ellerth/Faragher 'severe or pervasive' test.
Id. at 804 n.52.
176. See id. at 804.
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ployer meets the Ellerth-Faragher first prong, it "will likely forestall its own
vicarious liability for a supervisor's discriminatory conduct by nipping such
behavior in the bud.... because the employer will have prevented the super-
visor's behavior from rising to the severe or pervasive level required to be
actionable under Title VII.,'
77
Other circuits have applied the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense to
actionable hostile work environment claims in a manner similar to Judge
Wiener, without question as to whether the harassment was a single incident.
The Fourth Circuit, in Smith v. First Union National Bank, reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. 78 The Fourth Circuit
explicitly stated that the employer "must prove both elements of the affirma-
tive defense to avoid vicarious liability."'' 79 Since the bank failed to satisfy
the first element, the court ruled in favor of the employee.
180
The Fifth Circuit was split after the conflicting opinions in Indest, but
the split was resolved by Watts v. Kroger Co., in which Judge Wiener's
analysis was validated as controlling precedent in that circuit. 18' The court in
Watts said that the EllerthiFaragher opinion superseded the previous Fifth
Circuit test, and in order for the employer to avoid vicarious liability, both
prongs of the affirmative defense must be fulfilled. 182 In this case, the Fifth
Circuit found that the first prong was satisfied, but still held the employer
vicariously liable because the employer failed to satisfy the second prong.'
83
Finally, the Tenth Circuit also held that both prongs were necessary in or-
der to meet the Supreme Court's test. 184 In Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., the
court agreed with Judge Wiener and thoroughly dissected the reasoning of
Judge Jones. 8 5 The court stated, "we effectively rejected the position advanced
in Indest, i.e., that an employer's prompt corrective action can be sufficient by
itself to avoid vicarious liability under Title VII for sexual harassment commit-
ted by a supervisory employee."' 86 The court found that nothing suggested that
Faragher or Ellerth should be modified or that both prongs do not apply in all
cases of hostile work environments created by a supervisor.
187
Whether it is the Supreme Court's own language or the subsequent
precedent set forth by the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit
conflicts with other courts on this issue and is isolated by its analysis. Assum-
ing arguendo that Jamie McCurdy's allegations of sexual harassment were in
177. Id.
178. 202 F.3d 234, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2000).
179. Id. at 244.
180. Id. at 246.
181. 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
182. See id. at 509-10 (citations omitted).
183. See id. at 510.
184. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2001).
185. See id. at 1025-26.
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fact actionable, then the burden of responsibility for those actions should fall
on the employer and not on the innocent employee. The Eighth Circuit found
that putting the responsibility on the employer would expand strict liability
beyond what was authorized under Title VII case law. This is incorrect
analysis of Supreme Court precedent.
The distinction between co-worker harassment and supervisor harass-
ment is how the Court has rationalized placing the burden on the employer. In
dicta, Justice Marshall pointed out that "a supervisor is charged with the day-
to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe, produc-
tive workplace .... [I]t is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be
clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome
sexual conduct on subordinates."'' 8 9 While liability for co-worker sexual har-
assment requires notice by the employee, agency principles influence the
balancing of the burden onto the side of the employer in cases of supervisor
harassment so that vicarious liability is the norm. 9° Since the supervisor is
acting on behalf of the employer and he possesses authority given to him by
the employer, it warrants the burden shift. Because of the policy justifications
for conciliation rather than litigation, and the goal of promoting employer
anti-harassment policies, however, the Court was willing to relax agency
principles and allow an affirmative defense in certain circumstances.
The Eighth Circuit flipped these principles on their heads in McCurdy.
Aggressive policies of liability are necessary to continue to fight the problem
of sexual harassment in the workplace. While employers cannot be expected
to monitor every employee throughout the day, they can be expected to
screen their supervisor applicants closely, have a rigid anti-harassment policy
in place, and create a workplace culture that encourages reporting and use of
those policies. Allowing the employer to simply act reasonably and promptly
when an allegation of hostile work environment is made does not go far
enough. Supervisors are in a unique position of power over their subordi-
nates, and therefore, employers have the responsibility to ensure that their
supervisors will not abuse that power. The Eighth Circuit, in an effort to limit
that responsibility and maintain what it felt was the proper liability balance,
contrived a modified Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense that applies to
situations like that in McCurdy. This was an erroneous interpretation of Su-
preme Court precedent based on misguided fears and puts the Eighth Circuit
in direct conflict with every other circuit that has dealt with the issue. Al-
though the outcome in McCurdy may have been the proper one, the law that
was created was a misapplication of Title VII precedent and is incompatible
with the Supreme Court's affirmative defense in Ellerth and Faragher.
188. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004).
189. Meritor v. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76-77 (Marshall, J., con-
curring)
190. Id. at 77.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court provided a clear and straightforward affirmative test
that was meant to cover all hostile work environment claims. In an attempt to
interpret self-proclaimed ambiguity, the Eighth Circuit inappropriately modi-
fied the requirements for an affirmative defense, making it easier for employ-
ers to avoid liability for the actions of their supervisors. The ramifications of
this decision have yet to be seen, but the relaxation of the Supreme Court's
standards create a slippery slope that will render thousands of Americans
without actionable claims for the harassment and discrimination thrust upon
them by their supervisors.
JOHN C. AYRES
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